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1. Introduction
Motivated by the spectrum drought and explosive growth of increasing quality of service
requirements, cognitive radio as a promising technique has attracted a significant attention in
wireless community. In this chapter, we investigate and summarize the following contents:
• After a simple introduction of cognitive radio development in recent years, we focus
on the issue of how to implement interference mitigation by power control techniques
amongst multiple cognitive radios. An overview of concurrent power control schemes
is provided first, then we point out the existing problems and new challenges of power
control in cognitive radio networks, which leads us to concentrate on a novel mathematical
model-game theory.
• Game theory, which captures the dynamic decision-making behavior of selfish and rational
players have attracted a wide attention from cognitive radio community, specifically for
the game theory-based power control in cognitive radio networks. Several specific game
models which suit cognitive radios well are explored and introduced, and these models
are with typical good properties, for instance, they can well guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of the celebrated Nash equilibrium solution.
• There are many impractical assumptions in these existing literature, for example, complete
information and rationality and so on. In cognitive radio networks/systems, the
complexities of mobility and traffic models, coupled with the dynamic topology and the
unpredictability of link quality make these convectional game models meet with limited
success. So that we employ mixed-based power control game (MPCG) to deal with the
discrete power control issue. MPCG provides a novel point of view to investigate other
resource management problems in the uncertain environment including cognitive radio
context.
• We also discuss several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for
dynamic and incomplete information games. We use the application prospect of game
theory to conclude this chapter.
We will relax the full nature of the information requirements, and investigate the effective
power control from a very creative perspective termed as mix-strategy based matrix power
control game (MPCG) model. The typical max-min fairness criteria is chosen as the fair and
  
Power Control for Cognitive Radios:  
A Mixed-Strategy Game-Theoretic Framework 
Chungang Yang and Jiandong Li 
State Key Lab. of ISN, Xidian University 
China 
11
www.intechopen.com
2 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
optimal criteria for the mixed-strategy based power control algorithm, so that, the scheme
proposed in this chapter can greatly improve the fairness of the multi-user located at different
distance and with diversities of channel state information. The contributions in this chapter
are summarized as:
• An efficient and fair (max-min fairness) discrete power control scheme is proposed in
this chapter. Our scheme is based on the mixed-strategy of the matrix power control
game model. The convergence and uniqueness properties are well guaranteed as long
as available strategy space, e.g., the available power level is in a finite countable number.
• Additionally, mixed-strategy provides much larger strategy space for each player, so
that the opportunity for each player to achieve the Nash Equilibrium Solution can
well satisfy the Pareto optimality (effectiveness criteria). Because the pure strategy of
the traditional game-theoretic model is a special case of the mixed-strategy with the
determinate distribution.
• Last but not the least, the power control algorithm is greatly simplified by employing
an amazing transformation from the mathematical point of view. With the conventional
simplex method, the reformulated system model can be efficiently solved.
2. Background
The wireless industry is witnessing an explosive growth due to the increase in the number
of the mobile users, paralleled by the widespread deployment of heterogeneous wireless
networks. The requirements of the high transmit rate is becoming serious, and the high
wide-band data service urgently requires more spectrums. Unfortunately, the available
spectrum has been allocated completely. Meanwhile, recent measurement studies suggest
that radio spectrum is gradually becoming an under-utilized resource that should be better
explored. According to FCC, 15% to 85% assigned spectrum is used with large temporal and
geographical variations (1). By now, it has been recognized that the scarcity of radio spectrum
is mainly due to inefficiency of traditional static spectrum-allocation policies (1; 2). Motivated
by the promising cognitive radio (CR) technology, both academic and industrial communities
have shifted attention to dynamic spectrum access to alleviate alleviate spectrum scarcity
and improve spectrum efficiency. Dynamic spectrum access represented as cognitive radio
technology attracts wide attention to improve the spectrum-hunger situation. An introduction
to CR basics, different spectrum sharing models, and challenges and issues in designing
dynamic spectrum access networks can be found in (1–4).
While the cognitive radio community has had significant success popularizing the concept
of cognitive radio and developing prototypes, applications, and critical components, the
community has had a surprisingly difficult time agreeing upon exactly what is and is not
a cognitive radio beyond. Some commonalities have developed different definitions of
cognitive radios. However, as the original cognition cycle shown in Figure 1, the basic
characteristics can be summarized as follows: First, all of these definitions assume that
cognition will be implemented as a control process, presumably as part of a software defined
radio. Second, all of the definitions at least imply some capability of autonomous operation.
In detail, Observation: whether directly or indirectly, the radio is capable of acquiring
information about its operating environment. Adaptability: the radio is capable of changing
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Fig. 1. Cognitive radio and cognition cycle (1; 2).
its waveform. Intelligence: the radio is capable of applying information towards a purposeful
goal (6). The interference avoidance problem between the primary user and the secondary
user is a critical issue for the cognitive radio networks.
2.1 Background of game theory for wireless communications
In recent years, game theory has found an increasingly important role, especially for the
issues of radio resource management (17; 18). There are many prior game theory literature
which investigate various issues in wireless communications, especially, in the context
of Cognitive Radios (CRs). Game theory is a powerful tool to analyze the interactions
among decision-makers with conflicting interests and finds a rich extent of application in
communication systems including network routing, load balancing, resource allocation, flow
control and power control. There is an extensive power control strategies based on game
theoretic and utility theory (2). Meanwhile, they did achieve certain progress and better
results, especially for resource management issue for cognitive radios. But most of them are
based on the Nash game (5), which is essentially a non-cooperative game model.
Based on game theory, there are extensive research on the radio resource management (RRM)
issues, we cite some here, including the power control (4), spectrum sharing (2), spectrum
access (13), channel selection (12) and congestion control (19). However, the concurrent
research on the basis of the game theory almost all focuses on characterization description and
identification of the feasible equilibrium operating point, e.g., the typical Nash equilibrium
(6–9) and Nash bargaining solution (5), also including some other extensive equilibrium
solutions , e.g., Stackelberg equilibrium solution and correlated equilibrium solution(23).
Some others concentrate the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. For
example, the investigations in the potential game (18) and the super-modular game (6), which
are all game models with some nice properties guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness.
Actually, this is guaranteed by the specific utility function design in the game model (6–9; 18).
A great number of resource allocation andmanagement problems in communication networks
can be formulated as gamemodels, which are summarized in (17). There are also lots of works
on dealing with a diversity of new issues in current wireless networks. (1; 2) investigate
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the non-cooperative selfish behavior and spectrum sharing games of multiple WiFi access
point in the open/unlicensed spectrum, considers the interference management problem in
the ad hoc networks using the super-modular games (3). For example, (8; 9) investigate the
pricing function design for improving the Pareto optimality of the Nash equilibrium solution
in the power control games in CDMA systems, and others study the bandwidth allocation in
broadband networks, channel allocation in OFDMA networks, and the resource management
in the multi-media transmission networks, respectively from the cooperative game-theoretical
perspective, for example, the Nash bargaining game, and coalition formulation games. On
the other hand, some drawbacks and disadvantages have been found and encountered of
the traditional mathematical tools, which are unprecedentedly faced before. For example,
the convex optimization can not well formulate the dynamic decision making problem of the
multiple CRs. In addition, the decision making process is interactive, coupled among each
other, inter-dependently. Meanwhile, the dynamic topology and changing radio spectrum
holes, the opportunistic spectrum access and various service characteristics cause people
to find new mathematical molding tool in CR context. How to devise an adaptive QoS
measurement for the cognitive radios is really full of absolute challenge in CRNs. In addition,
from the concurrent research, we have seen that the game theory is really suitable for analysis
of cognitive radios, which is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Mapping of cognitive radio to game model (6).
2.2 Mixed-strategy considerations
John von Neumann’s (1928) theoretical formulation and analysis of such strategic situations
is generally regarded as the birth of game theory. von Neumann introduced the concept of
a mixed strategy: a mixed strategy is a probability distribution one uses to randomly choose
among available actions in order to avoid being predictable. In a mixed strategy equilibrium
each player in a game is using a mixed strategy, one that is best for him against the strategies
the other players are using. John Nash (1950) introduced the powerful notion of equilibrium
in games (including non-zero-sum games and games with an arbitrary number of players):
an equilibrium is a combination of strategies (one for each player) in which each player’s
strategy is a best strategy for him against the strategies all the other players are using. An
equilibrium is thus a sustainable combination of strategies, in the sense that no player has an
incentive to change unilaterally to a different strategy. A mixed-strategy equilibrium (MSE)
is one in which each player is using a mixed strategy; if a game’s only equilibria are mixed,
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we say it is an MSE game. In two-person zero-sum games there is an equivalence between
minimax and equilibrium: it is an equilibrium for each player to use a minimax strategy, and
an equilibrium can consist only of minimax strategies. Non-zero-sum games and games with
more than two players often have mixed strategy equilibria as well. Important examples are
decisions whether to enter a competition (such as an industry, a tournament, or an auction),
’wars of attrition’ (decisions about whether and when to exit a competition), and models of
price dispersion (which explain how the same good may sell at different prices), as well as
many others. Every finite n-person strategic game has a mixed Nash Equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, first, there is always a impractical complete information
assumption, which is players know choices of strategies and corresponding payoffs of other
players 1 (but not their actions 2). Second, the previous mentioned work mostly focused on
research of continuous power control scheme, since under the continuous assumption, it is
easy to deal with from the mathematical perspective. Traditional discrete power control is
based on the continuous power space, which is adaptive to the practical scenario and the
traditional method "discretizing "the continuous value that will not always guarantee the
convergence and uniqueness of continuous power control.
We assume that there exists only one time step, which means that the players have only one
move as a strategy. In game-theoretic terms, this is called a single stage or static game. Please
note that the definition of a static game means that the players have only one move as a
strategy, but this does not necessarily correspond to the time slot of an underlying networking
protocol. In many strategic situations a player’s success depends upon his actions being
unpredictable. Competitive sports are replete with examples. One of the simplest occurs
repeatedly in soccer (football): if a kicker knows which side of the goal the goaltender has
chosen to defend, he will kick to the opposite side; and if the goaltender knows to which side
the kicker will direct his kick, he will choose that side to defend. In the language of game
theory, this is a simple 2x2 game which has no pure strategy equilibrium. So that, mixed
strategy-based game theoretical formulation with nice existence of equilibrium solutions has
received a great attention.
2.3 Power control in cognitive radio systems
In a cognitive radio network, proper power control is of importance to ensure efficient
operation of both primary and secondary users. Even without the presence of primary users,
power control is still an issue among secondary users since the signal of one user may cause
interference to the transmissions of others. Thus, how to develop an efficient power allocation
scheme that is able to jointly optimize the performance of multiple cognitive radios in the
presence of mutual interference is of interest to such a system.
2.3.1 Power control
Power control mitigates unnecessary interference, and it can save the battery life of the mobile
devices, hence, increasing the network capacity and prolong battery’s life. Centralized power
control requires extensive information interaction between the base station and the mobile
1 In this chapter, we use player, secondary user and CR interchangeably.
2 We also use strategy, action and power level interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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terminal, which is applied inefficiently in practice. The distributive versions only depend on
local information, e.g., the received interference power or the Signal-to-interference and noise
ratio (SINR) to adaptively adjust the power level until each user obtains the objective SINR
threshold.
Recently, the max-min fairness criterion is widely accepted as the fairness criteria. The
max-min fairness is regarded as the one that the player can not increase the utility without
decreasing the utility of his components. It is a standardized fairness concept in the ATM
networks, and now it is widely accepted as the fairness criterion of the resource allocation
technique in the wireless communication networks. E.g. (9) addresses the joint transmit
power control and beam-forming technology if the multi-antenna systems with the aid of two
different objective function design. The same as (10), the authors of the (11) investigate the
max-min fairness for the MISO downlink systems. Based on the max-min fairness framework,
a distributed power control algorithm is proposed for the Ad-hoc networks.
2.3.2 Game theoretical consideration for power control
Autonomously dynamic behavior and performance analysis is of great importance in dynamic
spectrum sharing scenario, especially, when context information perceived by multiple
secondary users (SUs) of different levels of cognition is asymmetric, which is definitely
necessary in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) (1; 2). Game theory, which captures the
dynamic decision-making behavior of selfish and rational players have attracted a wide
attention fromwireless community (6–8). Meanwhile, its excellent predictability of next action
employed by the player, along with well established equilibrium solution concepts, lends
itself well to the design and analysis of CRNs. A survey of game theory for wireless engineers
is provided in (5), and its increasing use for spectrum management is exemplified in CRNs
(6–10).
2.4 Special game models
Only when the game has certain special structure, the gaming iteration algorithm can be
converged and lead to equilibrium solution, especially, in the distributed decision making
context, for instance, the cognitive radio networks, since there is only local information
support. There are several special cases of utility function design besides the above mentioned
several design criteria.
2.4.1 Potential games
A potential game is a special type of game where U are such that the change in value seen by
a unilaterally deviating player is reflected in the potential function V . A game G = {N ,S ,U}
is a potential game if there is a potential function V : S → R such that one of the following
conditions holds.
• Ui(si, s−i)−Ui(s
′
i , s−i) = Vi(si, s−i)− Vi(s
′
i, s−i), where for any i ∈ N, s ∈ S, and s
′
i ∈ Si;
• sgn{Ui(si, s−i) − Ui(s
′
i , s−i)} = sgn{Vi(si, s−i) − Vi(s
′
i, s−i)}, where sgn is the signal
function.
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It is an exact potential game, if and only if the first condition above denoted is satisfied. In
addition, the necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be an exact potential game is
∂2ui(si, s−i)
∂si∂sj
=
∂2ui(si, s−i)
∂sj∂si
, ∀j = i ∈ N. (1)
There are also some other special potential game, which requests different properties owned
by the utility function. For example, the coordination-dummy games, self-motivated games,
and bilateral symmetric interaction games. Detailed about this can be found in (1).
2.4.2 S-modular games
An S-modular game restricts {ui} such that for i ∈ N, either the following two equations (2)
or (3) is satisfied.
∂2ui(si, s−i)
∂si∂sj
≥ 0, ∀j = i ∈ N (2)
∂2ui(si, s−i)
∂si∂sj
≤ 0, ∀j = i ∈ N (3)
When (2) is satisfied, the game is said to be super-modular; when (3) is satisfied, the game
is said to be sub-modular. Myopic games whose stages are S-modular games and potential
games with a unique Nash equilibrium solution(NES) and follow a best response dynamic
converge to the NES when the NES is unique.
3. System model and problem formulation
In this chapter, a distributed scenario is considered as Figure 3, multiple secondary users
(SUs) opportunistically access in the spectrum holes of the GSM system by sensing technology
who works as the primary users (PUs), we don’t care about how the SUs access and how to
obtain such access opportunities in this chapter, but focus on how the multiple SUs choose the
optimal power control strategy to mostly improve performance of the secondary system and
maximize the payoff function of the individual SU.
In Figure 3, the rectangles represent the transmitters of the cognitive radio, and the circles
represent the respective receiver, the communication link is tagged as the solid lines with
the arrow. The lines depict the interference links of the CR-transmitter to the base station
(BS) of the primary system, e.g. the GSM system; and also including the mutual interference
between the multiple CR-transmitter and the specific CR-receiver. Here, we assume that each
CR-transmitter can well obtain the necessary information, e.g. the channel state information
and the interference situation of the considering scenario with the help of the BS. Consider the
heterogeneous networks, and the GSM coexists with the secondary network composed by the
multiple CRs who will employ the same available power levels as the GSM users.
251ower Control for Cognitive Radios: A Mixed-St ategy Game-Theoretic Framework
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PU SU
Communicat
ion Link
Interference 
Link
Fig. 3. Secondary system model: where GSM as primary user who is the provider of the
spectrum holes; and multiple secondary form a ad hoc cognitive scenario to implement an
opportunistically spectrum accessing fashion.
A typical strategic power control game model is a three-tuple defined as G = {N ,A,U},
where N is the player set, A = ∏i Ai is the action set, and U denotes the utility function
which depicts the preference relationship of the various players in the game model. Here, we
summarize a general joint rate and power control game model, which means that the action
set is (Ri, pi). There exists a tradeoff relationship among large SINR, low power consumption
and high transmit rate, which are shown in Figure 4. As Figure 4 shown, we have some
intrinsic characterizes summarized as follows.
• when the SINR λi and the transmit rate Ri are fixed, the utility function Ui won’t increase
with the increasing power level. This is partially due to the more power introduced into
the game process, the more mutual interference power to the other players in the same
gaming situation. That means when a player achieve the available SINR threshold, then
increasing more power will not do good to the performance improvement, but damage it.
• Meanwhile, if one player has obtained the required QoS, that means more power
consumption will shorten battery life of the equipment. So that the power control is
necessary.
• If the consuming power is fixed and one player is transmit in the fixed transmit rate, the
utility perceived by the player will increase with the SINR, which is illustrated in Figure
4. This tells us that when the higher SINR is guaranteed, the spectrum efficiency will be
higher too.
• In addition, we capture the case of the fixed power level, when the SINR is alsomaintained
on some fixed level, we can see that the utility leads a proportional relationship with
respect to the transmit rate as Figure 4 shown.
The utility functions denoted in the (6–9; 17; 18) are all satisfied above mentioned these
observations. From the typical power control game, we have some conclusions on the concept
of utility function. The design or selection of a suitable utility function form in the extension
of game theory for communications networks is always the bottleneck factor.
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Fig. 4. Characteristics description of the utility function in the power control games, with the
power level pi , transmission rate Ri and the obtained SINR λi into consideration. The typical
properties of the utility function (here, we choose the utility function as
ui(pi,Ri,λi) =
Rilog(λi)
pi
in the similar form of (7; 8)) are reflected among these impacting
parameters.
Lemma 1. Utility function development for the investigated resource management issue, for example,
power control, must satisfy two basic criteria: 1) utility function can be with physical meaning of the
formulated problem as described in Figure 4. 2) utility function should well capture the characteristics
of the preference of the users/players in the resource management game, for example, the relationship of
resource consumption and the QoS satisfaction perceived by users.
Definition 1. Utility Function: Without loss of generality, in this chapter, we employ the Shannon
channel capacity as the utility function Ui(pi,λi), which is shown as
Ui(pi ,λi) = log(1+ λi), (4)
The terms pi, gi and N represent the transmit power, the channel gain of CRi, and the CR
transceiver pairs number, where the signal-to-interference and noise ratio λi is defined as
λi =
pi gi
N
∑
j=1,j =i
pjgj + σ2
, (5)
where σ2 is the power density of background noise, and ∑Nj=1,j =i pjgj represents the total
interference power perceived by the SU i, which is introduced by the other players who are
sharing the same spectrum hole.
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In this chapter, we apply the max-min fairness as the fair and optimal power control criterion,
which is shown to be Pareto optimal and fair. As the primary user in the scenario considered is
the listened user, the CR opportunistic access can not damage the performance of the PU, and
the interference temperature constraints of the PU firstly satisfied, the discrete power control
problem can be formulated as
max
pi∈Pi
min
i
Ui(pi,λi) = log(1+ λi)
subject to
N
∑
i=1
pihi,k ≤ Tk, k ∈ K, (6a)
pi ∈ [pi,min : pi,step : pi,max], (6b)
where
N
∑
i=1
pihi,k ≤ Tk, k = 1, ...,K is the interference temperature constraint of the GSM BS.
Each user selfishly chooses the optimal power level to max-minimize the utility function.
Basically speaking, the problem is still a non-cooperative game model, for the cognitive radio
the interference temperature is introduced to constraint the power control of the secondary
spectrum utilization in order that the data transportation of the primary user is guaranteed.
In this chapter, we assume that the available discrete power level for each secondary user is
well satisfied the ITL constraints of the primary users.
Notice: In this chapter, we assume that the various SUs can observe the possible policy
(actions, e.g., the available power level) and further to derive the possible utility function,
which forms the payoff matrix, but they cannot determine what is the exact strategy during
the gaming process. But to exploit the mixed-strategy to guess. And the biggest probability of
some specific power level for each SU deserves to most exact strategy in this decision-making
step.
3.1 MPCG: Matrix discrete power control game
The decision-making flow chart of the matrix-game model-based discrete power control
approach can be shown as Figure 5.
Each CR-transmitter can achieve the context information including the channel state
information (CSI) and the interference temperature constraint thresholds of the primary user
for some specific spectrum by using sensing techniques. For instance, the signal sensing in
Gaussian noise environment can be carried out using higher order statistics (HOS). Then
CR-transmitters determine suitable discrete power level according to the context information
sensed/reasoned and the available power policy set. For instance, each CR-transmitter has 13
power level, which can be used accordingly in set P = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm].
The most important thing in the proposed MPCG model is to compute the utility matrix due
to based on which, we can determine the useful power in line with mixed policy design.
Therefore, the utility value achieved by each CR when it selects the available power level can
be predicted according to the power strategy interactions and combinations among multiple
CR-transmitters. After each CR gets the final utility value, then the utility matrix is made
up. Here, it deserves to pay attention to that not all the power level in the strategy space can
254 Foundation of Cognitive Radio S stems
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be utilized because the interference power level of the primary user must be satisfied first.
By now, we know it is of great interest to find the threshold of the available power level,
which is not the main objective in this chapter. However, in this chapter we assume that
every power strategy in the strategy space can be employed during the next analysis. In the
following step, the adaptively mixed-strategy selecting algorithm that will be implemented
by each CR-transmitter.
Sensing Utility Predicting
Mixed-Strategy Selecting
1 2
3
Fig. 5. Stream architecture
On the strategy space design, for instance, we choose the available power levels for each CR
from 5dBm to 33dBm, which is in accordance with the GSM system with the updating step
2dBm. The channel state information of each CR is G = [g=0.5632, g2 = 1.2321]. Therefore,
the power level of CR1 and CR2 can select is defined as P = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm].
According to definition of the utility function, we can obtain the following utility matrix when
different CRs choose multi-power levels. For CR1, the transmit power level is denoted as
P = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm], and the channel gain between the CR1 transmitter to the receiver
is g1 and the channel gain between the CR2 transmitter to the CR1 receiver is termed as g21,
so the interference power of CR2 introducing to the CR1 is p2g21, and the utility function of
CR1 takes the form of
U1(p1, p2) = log(1+ p1g1
/
(p2g21 + σ
2)). (7)
Similarly, the utility function of CR2 takes the form of
U2(p1, p2) = log(1+ p2g2
/
(p2g12 + σ
2)). (8)
From above utility function design, we can see that the optimal utility value achieved by each
CR depends not only its own power selection but also the others in the wireless environment.
And the strategy space of CR2 is also P2 = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm].
3.2 Basics of matrix game definition
Consider the complex interference radio environment, we assume that each CR will adjust
the power level entirely, e.g. when CR1 chooses the power level of 5dBm, the utility of the
CR1 maybe of 12 different cases, since CR2 has 12 different power level to choose in the set of
P2 = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm]. So that, we get a utility matrix A12∗12 for a two-player MPCG
model, where A = {aij, i = 1, ..., M, j = 1, ..., M} represents utility achieved when the CR1
selects any power strategy pi in set P1 = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm], and the CR2 selects any
power strategy pj in set P2 = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm].
Definition 2. Mixed-strategy definition: A Mixed-strategy for CR1 S1 = {xi, i = 1, .., M} is denoted
as the distribution function of the pure strategy P1 = [5dBm : 2dBm : 33dBm]. That is to say, the
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CR1 chooses the pure power level pi at a probability of xi . These vectors form a novel strategy space
which is referred as the mixed-strategy.
Therefore, we can conclude that the pure strategy can be considered as a special case of that
the CR1 choose the power level pi with a probability of "1". The vector xi satisfies 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,
and ∑Mi=1 xi = 1. In fact, the mixed-strategy provides more opportunity for each user, in
other words, the strategy space for each user is becoming larger so they all achieve more
available strategy to choose, the optimal strategy can more easily achieved. For CR2, we can
also similarly denote the mixed-strategy is S2 = {yi, i = 1, ..., M}.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the available power level for each user is with the
same dimension, and the Matrix Power Control Game (MPCG) model can be defined as
Definition 3. MPCG: a three-element G = 〈S1, S2, A〉 is called as matrix game, where S1 = {xi, i =
1, ..., M} and S2 = {yi, i = 1, ..., M} is the mixed-strategy of CR1 and CR2, respectively. The term
AM×M is the utility matrix as the above section described which is also where the concept comes out.
3.3 How to solve matrix power control game
First, the expected utility function must be clearly described for the matrix power control
game. As the utility matrix definition, the term represents the utility obtained when the CR1
selects the power strategy xi and the CR2 selects the power strategy yj. For the CR1, the matrix
power control game model can be formulated as
UCR1 = max
X∈S1
min
1≤j≤M
M
∑
i=1
ai,jxi
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, (9a)
M
∑
i=1
xi = 1, (9b)
where X is the mixed power vector selected by CR1. For simplicity, we utilize the term L(X)
represent min
1≤j≤m
∑
M
i=1 ai,jxi, which means L(X) = min
1≤j≤m
∑
M
i=1 ai,jxi. Then the matrix power
control game model with the mixed strategy design can be reformulated as
UCR1 = max
X∈S1
L(X)
subject to L(X) ≤
M
∑
i=1
ai,jxi, j = 1, 2, ..., M, (10a)
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, (10b)
M
∑
i=1
xi = 1. (10c)
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Let xi = xi
/
L(X), and the model of (10) can be further represented as
UCR1 = minX∈S1
M
∑
i=1
x′i
subject to
M
∑
i=1
ai,jx
′
i ≥ 1, j = 1, 2, ..., M, (11a)
0 ≤ x′i ≤ 1. (11b)
Theorem 1. (10) is equivalent to (11).
Proof. The optimal utility of G˜ =
〈
S1, S2, A˜
〉
is termed as U˜∗1 and U
∗
1 for G = 〈S1, S2, A〉. Using
x′i = xi
/
L(X), that is xi = x
′
i L(X) to take place of the xi in the Eq. (10), the objective function
is temporally unchanged, and next we focus on the constraint conditions. We assume that
the term L(X) > 0 always holds, if it initially can not guaranteed, luckily, we further prove
during the sequel section provides us a powerful technique to satisfy the assumption. First,
we see the constraint condition (3) in the Eq. (10) ∑Mi=1 x
′
i L(X) = 1, that is ∑
M
i=1 x
′
i = 1/L(X).
So observe the objective function again, we can conclude that the objective function takes the
form of UCR1 = max
X∈S1
L(X), which can represent as UCR1 = minX∈S1
1/L(X), and it finally appears
as UCR1 = min
X∈S1
1/L(X) = min
X∈S1
∑
M
i=1 x
′
i , as the Eq. (11) shown. Because we assume that
L(X) > 0 always holds, and the constraint condition xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...., M, when xi = x
′
i L(X),
and we can conclude that x′i L(X) = xi ≥ 0, that is x
′
i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...., M. Further, we only
need to represent the term xi as x
′
i , L(X) ≤ ∑
M
i=1 ai,jxi = ∑
M
i=1 ai,jx
′
i L(X), j = 1, 2, ..., M , and
the L(X) > 0 always holds, and it can be missed, so the constraint condition transforms into
∑
M
i=1 ai,jx
′
i ≥ 1, j = 1, 2, ..., M. We can conclude that Eq. (10) is equivalent to Eq. (11).
3.4 Simplex algorithm for linear programming problem
Finally, the problem is transformed into the simple linear programming as the Eq. (11) shown,
which can be easily solved using the simplex method. Meanwhile, for the power level of each
CR is limited, the matrix power control game model is absolutely guaranteed to have at least
one mixed-strategy. But in the context of a more practical scenario when CR2 employs a so
large power level that introduces more interference power to CR1, the utility achieved by
CR1 maybe zero even negative. We find the matrix game will be hard to be solved from the
mathematical perspective. Fortunately, we find a powerful tool to deal with this situation.
If we directly to employ the simplex method to search the mixed-strategy optimal power
level, the computation complexitywill be very high, now to simply the problem an equivalent
mathematical model is introduced. If the original matrix power control game model takes the
form of G = 〈S1, S2, A〉, and A = {aij, i = 1, ..., M, j = 1, ..., M}. Meanwhile, we define the
novel matrix game G˜ =
〈
S1, S2, A˜
〉
, where A˜ = {a˜ij = aij + d, i = 1, ..., M, j = 1, ..., M}.
Lemma 2. The optimal mixed-strategy of original model is the same as the newly-designed matrix
power control model. The optimal utility G˜ =
〈
S1, S2, A˜
〉
of is termed as U˜∗1 and U
∗
1 for G =
〈S1, S2, A〉. Meanwhile, we can conclude that U˜
∗
1 = U
∗
1 + d.
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Proof. For G = 〈S1, S2, A〉, we assume that the optimal mixed-strategy for CR1 and CR2 is X
∗
1
and Y∗2 respectively. So that, we know
U∗1 = E(X
∗
1 ,Y
∗
2 ) = maxmin
X∈S1
E(X,Y∗2 ). (12)
Adding a suitable parameter d to the both sides of the Eq. (12), and we get
U∗1 + d = E(X
∗
1 ,Y
∗
2 ) + d = maxmin
X∈S1
E(X,Y∗2 ) + d, (13)
further, mathematically we get
U˜∗1 = E(X˜
∗
1 , Y˜
∗
2 )
= maxmin
X∈S1,1≤j≤M
∑
M
i=1 a˜i,jxi
= maxmin
X∈S1,1≤j≤M
∑
M
i=1 (ai,j + d)xi
= maxmin
X∈S1,1≤j≤M
∑
M
i=1 ai,jxi + d
= E(X˜∗1 , Y˜
∗
2 ) + d
= U∗1 + d.
(14)
That is to say, for any X, and any optimal mixed-strategy of X∗1 and Y
∗
2 , the Eq. (14) always
holds. So the conclusion always holds.
Lemma 2 tells us that the objective function L(X) > 0, if we choose the suitable constant
parameter of d. So that, we conclude thta the proposed simplex method based power control
approach always works well.
3.5 Proposed algorithm
In this subsection, the proposed discrete power control algorithm is depicted as the
pseudo-code:
• Each CR collects the channel information (gi) and the accumulated interference
temperature (T) of the primary user from the sensing block of the CR system;
• In line with the necessary information achieved in the last step, each CR determines
minimum available discrete power level (pi) from the strategy space;
• The utility matrix (Ui) is predicted in this step, meanwhile, according to the method
introduced in section IV the matrix is simplified to easily deal with;
• Using the simplex method to find the optimal discrete power level (P∗i ) and obtain the
optimal utility (U∗i ) of each CR.
4. Numerical results
We consider a time-varying channel model which obeys the Raleigh distribution, and the
channel characteristics change with the time, each CR must dynamically and adaptively the
power level according to the wireless environment, e.g., the channel state information and the
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interference temperature of the requirement of the PUwhich are all considered in this chapter.
The background noise is in accordance with the Gauss distribution, and the power density is
1e-5 w.
4.1 Analysis of proposed algorithm
Figure 6 is the utility obtained of CR1 and CR2 after a limited iterations, because the
interaction of the strategy (e.g. the power level) and the interference between them,
the strategy choosing process is harshly hard. Fortunately based on the basics of the
non-cooperative game theory, the mixed-strategy optimal power level for each CR is always
existed. From the figures, we can see that in the context of the max-min fairness criterion
we finally achieved the optimal power level for CR1 and CR2, respectively, which are shown
as the peak value of the two three-dimensions pictures. The max-min utilities obtained of
the CR1 and CR2 are 7.3584 and 7.5888, respectively. From the numerical results, we can
conclude that our algorithm is fair, for the two CRs obtain the similar utility. Simultaneously,
the existence of the proposed algorithm is investigated as well.
Fig. 6. Utility of CR1 and CR2 (max-min) (27).
Fig. 7. Utility of CR1 and CR2 (max-max) (27).
4.2 Performance comparison
To show the effectiveness of our algorithm, here we compare with the greedy scheme which
is based on the max-max principle. When other factors are all the same as the proposed
algorithm, we obtain Figure 7. Though the fairness criterion changed into the max-max
principle, the optimal power level can also achieved, which tells that the proposed algorithm
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is robust. The most important issue reflected in the pictures that when the user become
greedily to pursue the maximum utility, first the fairness between them is damaged entirely,
and the entire performance also declined absolutely as a result of the selfish behavior. The
utilities obtained of the CR1 and CR2 using the max-max based proposed algorithm are 1.8512
and 3.7225, respectively. Observing from the perspectives of the two numerical results, we can
conclude that our algorithm can guarantee the existence, the fairness and effectiveness.
5. Conclusion and prospect of game theory for wireless communications
Due to the typical dynamic behavior of PU, various categories requirement for service,
limited resource constraints and complicated interactive context of the cognitive radio context,
the traditional mathematical tools encounter the unprecedented drawback in the multiple
users who interact with each other including the context/user information. Meanwhile,
the behavior of a given wireless device may affect the communication capabilities of a
neighboring device, notably because the radio communication channel is usually shared in
wireless networks. Game theory is a discipline aimed at modeling situations inwhich decision
makers have to make specific actions that have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences. It
has been used primarily in economics, in order to model competition between companies:
for example, should a given company enter a new market, considering that its competitors
could make similar (or different) moves? Game theory has also been applied to other areas,
including politics and biology. So that, from the engineering point of view, researchers capture
the similar characteristics between the issues from communication networks and the game
theory. Therefore, game-theoretic framework have been widely developed in this cognitive
radio scenarios.
The proposed discrete power control approach highlights a practical approach for the
cognitive system designer. The proposed mixed-strategy based scheme can entirely avoid
the convergence issue of the "discretizing scheme". The max-min fairness improves a lot of the
fairness and spectrum efficiency. Meanwhile, the Matrix game based scheme can easily extend
to multiple secondary users cognitive context but with huge computation complexity. This is
our next focus research topic as how implementation our proposed scheme in a multiple user
case, but is still represents a potential point in this chapter.
Game theory is a fascinating field of study. Due to the development of game theory, there are
always novel gamemodel suits a great number of issue the wireless communication networks,
for instance, the conventional radio resourcemanagement, access control and themedia access
control policy design. For example, potential game, super-modular game and Markovian
game have found a lot of use in wireless communication networks.
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